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Abstract: The presented article identifies and offers solutions to problems related to interpretation 
of international investment treaties, which have been authenticated in two or more languages. It 
focuses on situations when the provisions of investment treaties cause interpretational doubts 
because their wording is not identical in the official languages of the particular treaty. The scope of 
the analysis is narrowed down to the provisions concerning the jurisdiction of tribunals, which is 
justified due to practical implications of jurisdictional considerations in the course of arbitral 
proceedings. The first part of the article explains relevant applicable general principles of treaty 
interpretation as expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The second part 
is a case study, which analyses the problems faced by tribunals in the Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan, 
Berschader v. Russia and Daimler v. Argentina cases. The conclusions presented in the article may 
serve as a tool in the practice of investor – state arbitration, when implementation of specific 
provisions of international investment treaties occurs in the course of arbitral proceedings. 
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INTERPRETACJA NIEJEDNOZNACZNYCH POSTANOWIEŃ 
MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH TRAKTATÓW O OCHRONIE I WSPIERANIU INWESTYCJI 
SPORZĄDZONYCH W DWÓCH LUB WIĘCEJ JĘZYKACH 
 
Abstrakt: W artykule poruszono problematykę interpretacji międzynarodowych traktatów 
o popieraniu i ochronie inwestycji, które zostały sporządzone w dwóch lub więcej językach. Treść 
traktatów o popieraniu i ochronie inwestycji powoduje wątpliwości interpretacyjne, ponieważ 
brzmienie poszczególnych postanowień tychże traktatów w dwóch lub więcej językach, w których 
zostały sporządzone, nie jest identyczne. Zakres analizy artykułu został zawężony do postanowień 
dotyczących jurysdykcji trybunałów arbitrażowych, co jest uzasadnione doniosłością tych kwestii 
z perspektywy przebiegu postępowania arbitrażowego. W pierwszej części artykułu wyjaśniono 
zasady interpretacji traktatów prawa międzynarodowego uregulowane w Konwencji wiedeńskiej 
o prawie traktatów z 1969 r. Druga część artykułu stanowi analizę przypadków, w których 
poruszana problematyka była przedmiotem analizy trybunałów arbitrażowych, na przykładzie 
spraw Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan, Berschader v. Russia oraz Daimler v. Argentina. Wnioski 
wysunięte w artykule mogą być wykorzystane przy stosowaniu postanowień traktatów o popieraniu 
i ochronie w praktyce postępowań arbitrażowych na linii inwestor – państwo. 
                                                          
1  The author is a recipient of the scholarship granted by the Adam Mickiewicz University 
Foundation. The article is part of the project financed from funds received from the National 
Science Centre Poland, granted on the basis of decision number DEC-2012/07/N/HS5/01003.  
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Investment treaties are treaties of public international law, which are concluded between 
states. Although typically investment treaties are concluded between two contracting 
states, there are also multilateral investment treaties (see for example the North American 
Free Trade Agreement or the Energy Charter Treaty). However, in the present article 
references to Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) also include multilateral treaties, 
despite the linguistic reservation related to this simplification.  
Although the importance of BITs and the arbitral proceedings based on them is 
commonly undervalued in the perception of public opinion, the ongoing development of 
international investment law is a fact. Whilst in 1996 only 38 investor-state arbitration 
cases were registered in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(referred to as the “ICSID”), in June 2012 the number had reached 390 (The ICSID 
Caseload – Statistics 2012, 7). If one remembers that not all investor – state arbitrations 
are administered by the ICSID, the number of publicly known cases at the end of 2011 
amounted to 450 (IIA Issues Note 2012, 1). There are currently more than 3000 BITs in 
force worldwide (World Investment Report 2013, 101), which may give ground for 
potential disputes in the future.  
The growing number of arbitral proceedings based on BITs raises numerous 
innovatory legal issues, not present in previous proceedings. Among many other legal 
issues present in international investment law and investor – state arbitration, some of 
them are related to linguistic aspects of the underlying BITs. The present article analyses 
the situation when there are interpretative doubts arising from the wording of a BIT 
which has been authenticated in two or more languages. 
The methodology is based on the analysis of wording of international treaties 
and of available arbitral awards and the literature on the subject. Part of the article is 
descriptive in nature. The aim of this part is to present international investment law to the 
reader and then to illustrate the problems related the interpretation of ambiguous 
provisions of BITs in two or more languages within the general framework of 
international investment law. Subsequently, the article contains a general analysis of the 
legal norms expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It further 
becomes a case study. It goes beyond the black letter of law and refers to the relevant 
case law, illustrative for the problems related to the subject of the article. It analyses the 
case law by applying relevant principles of treaty interpretation to the problems 
encountered by the arbitral tribunals in the cases relevant to the subject. Therefore, it 
might be used as a tool in practice, when implementing specific provisions of 
international investment treaties in the course of future arbitral proceedings. 
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Brief introduction to BITs 
 
One of the basic characteristics of BITs is that they create the possibility that investors, 
understood to be private subjects, file law suits against host states (states on the territory 
of which investments are made), understood to be sovereign states, in arbitral 
proceedings, which are binding. BITs incorporate a dispute resolution method known 
between private parties, i.e. arbitration. Not only do arbitral awards bind the parties to the 
proceedings, but also in the case that the losing party is not willing to pay the 
compensation awarded therein, they may serve as a basis of enforcement proceedings 
conducted in the vast majority of jurisdictions around the world.  
Arbitration is based on consent of the parties (Dugan, Wallace, Rubins, Sabahi, 
2008, 219). The host states – the contracting states to the BIT which is the basis for 
particular proceedings – give their consent to arbitration in advance, already at the 
moment when they conclude the BIT. It is the consent intended for the future and given 
towards a specified group of subjects, who are not described individually, but by their 
features, such as the nationality or the status of being an “investor” within the meaning of 
the BIT and international investment law.  
Although they are not well known to the general public, there is no doubt that 
arbitral cases are important for states and, indirectly, for their citizens. The example of 
CME v. Czech Republic case might be noted, in which the compensation awarded to be 
paid by the host state was approximately 270 million US dollars plus interest (CME v. the 
Czech Republic, 2003, 161). This amount was comparable to the annual budget of the 
Ministry of Health of the respondent state (Green, 2003, W1). Another example is 
Occidental v. Ecuador case, in which the respondent state was ordered to pay 
compensation in the amount exceeding 1 billion 700 million US dollars (Occidental 
Petroleum v. Ecuador, 2012, para. 876). 
 
Linguistic aspects of investment arbitration 
 
BITs are instruments of public international law. It is common practice that they are 
concluded between the contracting states in two or more languages. It is not a surprise 
that contracting states wish to conclude treaties in their official languages. Thus, if the 
official languages of contracting states are different, a natural solution is that the treaty 
may be concluded in at least two languages, i.e. in each official language of each 
contracting state. 
In some situations, a treaty may be concluded in even more languages, when the 
contracting states decide that a neutral language, typically a language commonly used in 
the type of relations governed by the negotiated treaty, will be decisive in case of 
divergences between the authentic texts of the treaty. An example of such solution in the 
realm of international investment law can be found in the BIT concluded between Cyprus 
and Poland, which in its art. 13.3. establishes: 
 
„[…] Done and signed in Warsaw on the 4th June 1992 in two originals in the 
Polish, Greek and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of 
disagreement as regards the interpretation of the text, the English version will 
prevail.”  




A decision to choose a third language to be the prevailing one in case of divergences in 
the interpretation may be justified by various factors. For example it might be a response 
to situations such as those when (i) the languages are not commonly known in the other 
contracting state (official languages of the contracting states are not commonly known 
outside of the borders of these states) or when (ii) none of the contracting states agrees to 
recognise the supremacy of the other state's language. 
BITs can be subject to interpretation by a whole group of different interpreters. 
For example they can be interpreted by a legal consultant providing services for one of 
the parties, an arbitrator deciding the case, a common citizen of a contracting state, who 
wishes to understand the nature of international obligations undertaken by his home state 
in the BIT etc. As observed above, it is not uncommon for a BIT to be authenticated in 
two or more languages. If this is the situation, the question arises as to how should an 
interpreter of such BIT – regardless of to which type of interpreter he belongs and what is 
the final purpose of the interpretation process – approach the issue of the interpretation of 
such treaty. In the context of BITs it is not only an academic question. The answer given 
to this question in the course of arbitral proceedings based on a BIT may have an impact 
on the final outcome of these proceedings, and as a result on the decision whether 
compensation is to be paid, and if so – in what amount.  
 
General rules of treaty interpretation  
 
BITs are treaties of public international law and as such, they must be interpreted in 
accordance with the principles of public international law. Thus, generally they should be 
interpreted in accordance with the rules expressed in articles 31, 32 and 33 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (referred to as the “Vienna Convention”). The 
importance of the Vienna Convention cannot be underestimated, as it “would apply in 
interpreting a BIT even if the State contracting parties were not parties to the Vienna 
Convention as they reflect customary international law” (Weiniger, 2006, 254). 
It is observed that in general there are three basic methods of treaty 
interpretation in public international law: (i) objective approach towards the 
interpretation, i.e. interpretation based on the real text of the treaties and the words used 
therein, (ii) subjective approach towards the interpretation, i.e. interpretation based on 
intention of the contracting states, and (iii) the broad approach towards the interpretation, 
based on the purpose and the aim of the treaty as a basis for interpreting the meaning of 
specific provisions. Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention to a certain extent 
adopt all three approaches listed above (Shaw, 2006, 539). 
The plurality of authentic texts of an international treaty is always an important 
factor in its interpretation and it may not be ignored. In general, the existence of authentic 
texts in two or more languages can either (i) complicate the interpretation, being an 
additional source of ambiguity or obscurity in the terms of the treaty, or (ii) facilitate the 
interpretation, being helpful when the meaning of terms is ambiguous in one language, 
but it is clear as to the intentions of the parties in the another language (Yearbook, 1967, 
225).  
The existence of a plurality of the authentic texts of an international treaty 
introduces in its interpretation a new element, that is a comparison of the authentic texts 
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of the treaties (Yearbook, 1967, 225). Although there is no express directive, which 
obliges an interpreter to always compare the authentic texts of the treaty at hand, if there 
is a difference or a dispute over interpretation presented to a court or to a tribunal, 
“comparison of texts is likely to be essential” (Gardiner, 2008, 360). There are various 
possible scenarios when a term of a treaty can be ambiguous or obscure: (i) it is so in all 
the authentic texts of the particular treaty, (ii) one or more texts of the treaty are clear, but 
another text (or texts) is (or are) ambiguous, or (iii) apparently the authentic texts seem 
not to have exactly the same meaning.  
Of the listed provisions of the Vienna Convention, it is the article 33 which regulates the 
interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages. It reads as follows:  
 
“1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties 
agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text 
was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides 
or the parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic 
text.  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be 
adopted.” 
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the article 33 of the Vienna Convention should be read 
together. They regulate the significance of the choice of the contracting states concerning 
the authentic texts of the treaties. Paragraph 1 of the referred provision regulates 
situations when treaties provide that in the event of divergence between the texts, a 
chosen text is to prevail over the texts in other languages. Such situation is not 
uncommon and is visible at the example of the invoked BIT Poland – Cyprus. Paragraph 
2 clearly states that if the choice referred to in the paragraph 1 has not been made by the 
contracting states, none of the authentic texts of the treaty prevails over the other 
language versions.  
Paragraph 3 of the article 33 of the Vienna Convention introduces a presumption 
that the terms of the treaty have the same meaning in each authentic text. It is referred to 
as the principle of the “unity” of the treaty, according to which both (or all) the authentic 
texts express the terms of the agreement between the contracting states. However, they 
remain language versions of one document only, which remains the one treaty concluded 
between the parties. There exists one set of terms accepted by the parties to the treaty and 
one common intention with respect to those terms, agreed by them and expressed by the 
adopted wording of the treaty.  
Thus, according to the principle expressed in the article 33 paragraph 3 of the 
Vienna Convention, when applying a treaty an interpreter must look for a common 
meaning of the texts and for the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the 
terms included by them in the treaty. The existence of two or more authentic texts of the 
treaty justifies neither simple preference of one of these texts to another, nor discarding 
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the normal means of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity on the basis of the general 
principles of treaty interpretation. By recourse to the normal means of interpretation, 
efforts should be made in order to reconcile the texts and to look for the intention of the 
parties behind the words.  
The presumption that the terms of the treaty are intended to have the same 
meaning in each of its authentic text (paragraph 3 of article 33 of the Vienna 
Convention), together with the principle of the equal authority of authentic texts 
(paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 33 of the Vienna Convention) guarantee that the unity of 
the treaty is observed. Effort should be made to find a common meaning of the 
interpreted provisions.  
Despite these efforts, a comparison of the interpreted provision in both (or all) 
authentic texts of the treaty may disclose a difference of meaning, which leads to a 
conclusion that the authentic texts cannot be presumed have the same meaning. In such 
situations, paragraph 4 of article 33 of the Vienna Convention applies. According to it, if 





 of the Vienna Convention – does not remove the difference of 
meaning in the terms used in the authentic texts of the treaty, the interpreter is entitled to 
adopt the meaning “which best reconciles” the conflicting texts, having regard to the 
object and purpose of the treaty.  
When looking for the object and purpose of the treaty – as is required under 
article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention – recourse to the “original language” of 
the treaty may result helpful. By this term it is understood the language in which the 
treaty was negotiated, drawn up or firstly drafted (Gardiner, 2008, 366). 
                                                          
2 “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which 
was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) 
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable.” 
3 “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable.” 
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Obviously, the mechanism established in article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna 
Convention does not exclude the possibility that the outcome of the interpretation of the 
provision of the treaty is that the meaning of the interpreted provision is the meaning 
which is clear in one of the authentic texts. Such an outcome is perfectly acceptable and it 
is not contrary to the directive that the interpreter should not simply prefer one authentic 
text to another (Gardiner, 2008, 375).  
 
Practical significance of linguistic aspects of BITs 
 
A difference of meaning of provisions authenticated in two or more languages can cause 
interpretative problems at various stages of arbitral proceedings based on BITs. However, 
the practical importance of this issue appears to be the most visible when analysing the 
scope of “consent to arbitrate” given by states. In other words, it is especially visible at 
the jurisdictional stage of the arbitral proceedings, when the arbitral tribunal decides 
whether it has authority to hear the case at hand.  
The jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals may be understood as the power to 
decide the case. The basis for the jurisdiction is consent of the parties (Dugan, Wallace, 
Rubins, Sabahi, 2008, 219). Without the consent to arbitrate, no arbitral tribunal may 
have jurisdiction at all. If any tribunal renders an award without having jurisdiction, or 
exceeding its scope, subsequent recognition and enforceability of the award may be 
denied (Born, 2009, 201-202), or it may be annulled under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention). 
When the respondent state invokes objections to jurisdiction of the tribunal 
hearing the case, it is necessary to interpret the “jurisdictional clause” included in the 
BIT, that is the clause of the BIT on the basis of which the proceedings are commenced 
which contains the states’ consent to arbitrate. At this stage, if there are differences 
between the authentic texts of the BIT, they may not be ignored.  
The Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan case provides an example of such situation. 
The case was conducted on the basis of the BIT concluded between Turkey and 
Turkmenistan. In that case, the tribunal issued a decision, the sole purpose of which was 
to determine: (i) the number of authentic versions of the BIT at hand, (ii) accurate 
translations into English of any authentic version(s) of the BIT (to the extent there are 
authentic version(s) of the BIT in languages other than English), and (iii) the meaning 
and effect of article VII.2 of the BIT, which regulated the issue of jurisdiction (Kilic 
Insaat v. Turkmenistan 2012, para. 1.19.). 
The approach of the arbitral tribunal towards the interpretation of the BIT 
authenticated in more than one language was in accordance with article 33 paragraph 1 
and article 33 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention. The tribunal needed to identify 
what were the authentic texts of the BIT. The doubts of the tribunal were well justified, as 
the authentic English version of the BIT provided that the Treaty was “DONE at 
Ashghbat on the day of May 2, 1992 in two authentic copies in Russian and English”, 
whilst the authentic Russian version of the BIT provided that the treaty was “Executed on 
May 2, 1992 in two authentic copies in Turkish, Turkmen, English and Russian 
languages” (as translated into English in the copy of the arbitral award, see Kilic Insaat 
v. Turkmenistan 2012, para. 2.8.). 
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The tribunal decided that English and Russian were authentic texts of the BIT. It 
did not agree with the argument that the Turkish and/or Turkmen versions were authentic 
texts of the BIT as well, together with the English and Russian texts. The tribunal’s 
reasoning was based on the fact that there was no evidence of the existence of the Turkish 
and/or Turkmen texts of the BIT and that the respondent was unable to produce signed 
copies of either the Turkish or the Turkmen versions of the BIT.  
The determination of which were the authentic versions of the BIT was 
important for the interpretation of article VII.2 of the BIT. This provision was the 
“jurisdictional clause”, which contained the basis of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in 
the case. Its interpretation was crucial to determine the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
English version of article VII.2. of the BIT provided that: 
 
“If these desputes (sic) cannot be settled in this way within six months following 
the date of the written notification mentioned in paragraph 1, the dispute can be 
submitted, as the investor may choose, to [arbitration]  
provided that, if the investor concerned has brought the dispute before the courts of 
justice of the Party that is a party to the dispute and a final award has not been 
rendered within one year” (Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan 2012, para. 2.10).  
 
At the same time, the Russian version of the BIT, translated literally into English 
provided that: 
 
“If the referenced conflicts cannot be settled in this way within six months 
following the date of the written notification mentioned in paragraph 1, the conflict 
may be submitted at investors choice to   
[arbitration] 
on the condition that, if the concerned investor submitted the conflict to the court of 
the Party that is a Party to the conflict, and a final arbitral award on compensation 
of damages has not been rendered within one year” (Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan 
2012, para. 2.11).  
 
The problem was whether the requirement to refer the dispute to local courts before 
submitting it to arbitration was optional, or mandatory. The Russian version of the BIT 
was clear as to the mandatory nature of this requirement. However, the English version 
was ambiguous and allowed for both interpretations. Thus, potential existence of 
additional authentic texts of the BIT could have a crucial result for the analysis. However, 
their existence was not proved and the tribunal continued its analysis on another basis.  
Although the tribunal did not refer expressly to article 33 paragraph 4 of the 
Vienna Convention in the relevant passage, nevertheless it applied this provision in an 
implied – but correct – way. It interpreted the jurisdictional clause of the BIT by applying 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, i.e. by applying the general rules of 
interpretation. By using supplementary means of interpretation regulated in article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention, the tribunal referred to the circumstances surrounding conclusion 
of the BIT and on that basis decided that the local court requirement was obligatory 
(Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan 2012, paras. 9.18 – 9.23). 
As a result, there was no need to “reconcile” the text of art. VII.2. of the BIT 
within the meaning of article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention. However, it 
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seems that if it had been done, in this particular case the final outcome would have been 
the same. If one version of the BIT is clear, and the second one is ambiguous in the sense 
that it allows both interpretations, the Tribunal would have easily agreed to reconcile 
texts as having the meaning allowed by both versions. Thus, the final conclusion reached 
by the Tribunal was the same as the effect of “reconciliation” of both versions would 
have been.  
Berschader v. Russia case is another example when the language versions of the BIT 
were analysed by the arbitral tribunal in the context of the scope of jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. The proceedings in that case were based on the BIT concluded between Russia 
and Belgium, which had been authenticated in two texts – Russian and French. 
As already observed, the power of the tribunal to decide the case depends on the 
valid consent of the parties. In the context of BITs, one of crucial element when 
determining the scope of the consent is to determine what is understood to be an 
“investment” protected under the BIT and thus, what is the scope of the consent to 
arbitrate given by the states.  
The crucial question to determine the jurisdiction of the tribunal in this particular 
case was whether a financial contribution to the construction of a building for the Russian 
Supreme Court qualifies as an “investment” under the applicable BIT. The Russian term, 
used for “investment” in the Russian authentic version of the BIT was narrower than the 
French term, used in the French authentic version of the BIT. The tribunal observed that: 
 
“Firstly, the Tribunal finds ample evidence amongst Russian-English legal and 
economic dictionaries for translating the term kapiralovlozhenie as "investment" 
and the term vlozhit as "to invest". Secondly, it is possible to point to a large 
number of BITs concluded by the Respondent where Russian and English are the 
authentic languages of the Treaty and where the term kapitalovozhenie is translated 
as "investment" and vlozhil is translated as '"to invest”. It is thus clear that, while 
those terms may sometimes be used in the Russian language in the more limited 
sense of "contributions to the charter capital of a joint venture", they are in fact also 
frequently used in a broader sense corresponding exactly to the English terms 
"investment" and "invest" (Berschader v. Russia, 2006, para. 109).  
 
The tribunal added: 
 
“Furthermore, regard must be had to the French version of the Treaty which, as set 
out in the Protocol, is equally as authoritative as the Russian version. The French 
text uses the words investissement and investir. With respect to these French terms, 
there can be no doubt but that their ordinary meaning is identical to that of the 
English words "investment" and "to invest". Therefore, and for the reasons set out 
above, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent's objections on this point must fail” 
(Berschader v. Russia, 2006, para. 110).  
 
It is not clear on what basis did the tribunal refer to English definitions. The Tribunal did 
not explain the legal basis of “pointing to a large number of BITs concluded by the 
Respondent where Russian and English are the authentic languages”. It may be assumed 
that the legal basis for this step was article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention, 
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which refers to general rules of interpretation, amongst which one can find article 31 
paragraph 3 point b
4
. 
However, it seems that the tribunal misapplied the above rule. “Subsequent 
practice” relates to the application of the particular international treaty, here the BIT 
Russia – Belgium. It does not refer to the practice between the states related to all the 
other international treaties.  
The correct approach to solve the problem, which arose in the Berschader v. 
Russia case seems to be offered by the application of article 31 paragraph 1 of the Vienna 
Convention,
5
 as a result of the referral from article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna 
Convention. In the analysis conducted by the tribunal one may see a conclusion that the 
terms used in the Russian authentic version of the BIT corresponds to the intention of the 
contracting states, as it is the ordinary meaning of the terms in both official languages. 
Thus, there was no need for applying the “reconciliation” under article 33 paragraph 4 of 
the Vienna Convention, but were it applied, it would have led to the same outcome.  
The issue of authentic texts of the BIT arose also in the Daimler v. Argentina 
case. It was conducted under the BIT concluded between Argentina and Germany. The 
two authentic texts of the BIT were Spanish and German, although the working language 
of the arbitral tribunal was English. 
In this case the scope of jurisdiction was conditioned upon application of the Most 
Favored Nation clause. This standard of protection guarantees that the states – parties to 
the BIT – shall not accord investments in their respective territories by nationals or 
companies of the other contracting state treatment less favourable than the treatment 
accorded investments of companies or investments of nationals or companies of any third 
state.  
The application of the Most Favored Nation clause is conditioned, among other 
requirements, upon existence of an “investment”, a “treatment” and the qualifier that it 
must be “in the territory” of the host state. The problem faced by the tribunal in the 
Daimler v. Argentina case was whether the qualifier referred to the term “treatment”, or 
to the term “investment”. In this context the tribunal observed:  
 
“English translation misconstrues the qualifier “in its territory” by attaching it to the 
word “investments” rather than to the word “treatment”. The mistake is perhaps 
understandable, as the translation was prepared primarily from the German original, 
which […] arguably renders the intended reference point of the phrase “in its 
territory” uncertain. By contrast, Articles 3(1) and 3(2) of the Spanish text both 
clearly attach the phrase “in its territory” to the word “treatment” (Daimler v. 
Argentina, 2012, footnote 394).  
 
Differently from the awards rendered in Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan and in 
Berschader v. Russia cases, the tribunal in Daimler v. Argentina case expressly 
referred to the Vienna Convention: 
                                                          
4 “There shall be taken into account, together with the context any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 
5 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 




“Since […] both the Spanish and German versions of the text are equally “binding” 
or “authentic”, this minor inconsistency is easily resolved by Article 33(3) of that 
Vienna Convention, according to which the terms of a treaty are presumed to have 
the same meaning in each authentic text. In case of difference, Article 33(4) directs 
that the meaning which “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”.”  
 
The tribunal followed:  
 
“Applying these rules to the present discrepancy: since the Spanish text is clear as 
to the proper placement of the qualifier “in its territory” while the German text 
leaves the question open, the interpretation given by the Spanish text must be 
preferred” (Daimler v. Argentina, 2012, footnote 394).  
 
The mere application of the article 33 of the Vienna Convention and the final decision 
reached by the tribunal are correct in the circumstances of the case. However, it seems 
that the tribunal to a certain degree misapplied the Vienna Convention. Although article 
33 paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention introduces the presumption that the authentic 
texts have the same meaning, still - the meaning must be interpreted by application of the 
general rules of treaty interpretation. The meaning may not be simply reached by the 
tribunal by stating that “one version is clear”. One must look for the common intention of 
the parties behind the words – and sometimes it may be that a clear provision must be 
interpreted differently from that, which initially seems to emerge from its literal wording.  
The issue in Daimler v. Argentina concerned application of the Most Favored Nation 
clause to the jurisdictional provisions of the BIT. It remains one of the most controversial 
topics in investor – state arbitrations and in international investment law. Thus, it is not 
surprising that even the proper application of general rules of treaty interpretation could 
not have led to a final determination of which approach is the correct one. As a result, the 
application of the rule of reconciliation provided in article 33 paragraph 4 of the Vienna 
Convention was justified. However, the Tribunal simply stated that one version is clear 
while the other is not, which led it to the decision that the clear version shall prevail over 
the ambiguous one. Therefore, the tribunal ignored that article 33 paragraph 4 of the 
Vienna Convention relates the reconciliations of authentic texts “to the object and 
purpose of the treaty”. Despite that, although the tribunal did not apply the mechanism to 
the full extent, it reached conclusions justified in the circumstances of the case.  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
The potential interpretative problems arising from those situations when the BITs have 
been authenticated in two or more languages do occur in practice of international 
investment law. This may be seen at the examples of awards rendered in Kilic Insaat v. 
Turkmenistan, Berschader v. Russia and Daimler v. Argentina cases. In the context of 
investment arbitration this issue is especially visible at the jurisdictional stage of the 
proceedings.  
These considerations are not purely academic. Decisions made by tribunals in 
investor – state arbitrations have direct influence on the final outcomes of disputes. If the 
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tribunals decide that they lack jurisdiction, the case is dismissed and the respondent can 
neither be found liable for a breach of the BIT nor ordered to pay compensation. If the 
tribunal decides otherwise, the proceedings enter the merits stage, which may end up in 
an award ordering the respondent state to pay compensation, in some cases in significant 
amounts.  
The analysis contained in the article shows that international law developed a 
mechanism which offers solutions to the potential problems related to the differences in 
meaning between the authentic versions of the BITs. They are expressed in article 33, 
read together with articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. All authentic texts of the 
BIT are equally authoritative – unless the contracting states decided that one of the 
versions prevails in case of divergence – and are presumed to have the same meaning. If 
the comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning, they must be 
interpreted in accordance with the general principles of treaty interpretation, as regulated 
in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Only if it does not remove the difference 
of meaning revealed by comparison of authentic texts, the tribunal should choose the 
meaning which best reconciles all the authentic texts, but having regard to the object and 
purpose of the BIT.  
From the analysis of Kilic Insaat v. Turkmenistan, Berschader v. Russia and 
Daimler v. Argentina cases it emerges that when facing the issues related to interpretation 
of BITs authenticated in two or more languages, the tribunals in investment arbitration do 
not always properly apply the Vienna Convention. This creates a risk of rendering 
incorrect decisions, which could be contrary to the established rules of treaty 
interpretation. Despite the above, in the analysed cases the arbitral tribunals rendered 
decisions which were correct in the circumstances of the cases. What is even more 
significant, if these arbitral tribunals would have properly applied the rules established in 
the Vienna Convention, they would have rendered the same decisions on the 
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